University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications

Sociology, Department of

Winter 1995

Developing an Exchange Network Simulator
Barry N. Markovsky
University of South Carolina - Columbia, barry@sc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/socy_facpub
Part of the Sociology Commons

Publication Info
Published in Sociological Perspectives, Volume 38, Issue 4, Winter 1995, pages 519-545.
http://www.ucpressjournals.com/journal.asp?j=sop
© 1995 by University of California Press

This Article is brought to you by the Sociology, Department of at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Perspectives
Sociological
Copyright 01995 PacificSociologicalAssociation

Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 519-545
ISSN0731-1214

DEVELOPINGAN EXCHANGE
NETWORKSIMULATOR
BARRYMARKOVSKY*
University of Iowa

in
ABSTRACT: 'X-Net"is a computersimulationthat I developed
withNetworkExchange
conjunction
Theory.Usersof X-Netcanexplorethe
rulesof exchange,and negotiators'
effectsof differentnetworkstructures,
on the dynamicsand outcomesof resourceexchangesin social
strategies
networks.
Thisarticlerecounts
theprocess
in addition
ofX-Net'sdevelopment,
to keysubstantive,
anddesignissuesthatmotivated
itsformand
theoretical,
content.It concludes
with a discussionof the relationship
betweentheory,
andempirical
tests.
simulation,

INTRODUCTION
Most social scientists who are exposed to computer simulations only see the end
results of long developmental phases. In general, investigators report on the
behavior of a simulated process under various configurations of modeling
assumptions and parameters. This is the science of computer simulation. In the
course of developing the simulation, however, the author invariably proceeds in
an evolutionary fashion, building layer upon program layer in a progressive, albeit
trial-and-error-laden, series of operations. This is the art of simulation.
My purposes here are to review both the evolution and present form of X-Net,'
a simulation that has become a useful adjunct to a particular program of theorydriven research. Although I also discuss briefly some substantive findings, these
are not the focus. Instead, I review how the program of theory and empirical
research helped to spawn the simulation and how the simulation, in turn, has been
able to promote theory development and empirical testing. The discussion is
primarily aimed at: (1) those who have not written a simulation, but also (2) those
who have done so but may not have considered its connections to the theorybuilding process, and even (3) those who may have a particular interest in social
exchange network simulations. The framework for my discussion is chronological
* Directall
correspondenceto: BarryMarkovsky,Departmentof Sociology,Universityof Iowa,Iowa City,IA 52242.
e-mai:barry-markovsky@uiowa.edu
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highlightingthe recent intellectualhistory of "networkexchange theory"and XNet, the simulation.
BACKGROUND
Forover a decadeI have been intriguedby socialexchangeprocesses-particularly,
how network restrictions on those processes alter behaviors and exchange
outcomes. I was firstinspiredby a prominentarticleby Cook,Emerson,Gillmore,
and Yamagishi(1983).Arguingfrom the perspective of RichardEmerson's(1972)
"power-dependence"(P-D) framework,the authors presented results for several
laboratoryexperiments and computer simulations, finally offering an explicit,
mathematicalformula(called the "vulnerability"model) for calculatingnetwork
exchange outcomes. Although the computer simulation program was little
discussed, its key featureswere describedbrieflyin a footnote.
The research findings were fascinating. They clearly demonstrated that
experimentalsubjects in off-centerpositions in a variety of networks faredmuch
betterin theirexchangesthan centrallylocatedsubjects.Forexample,in a network
configuredas A-B-C-D-E,
positions B and D obtained significantlyhigher
and
than
and
C's
E,
A,
C,
profits
profits were approximatelyequal to those of A
and E. It is importantto note, however, that what we now call a "one exchange
rule"was in force:Every subject was restrictedto makingjust one exchange per
round of negotiation, even if connected to more than one potential exchange
partner.It canbe seen that undersuch conditions,A, C,and E allriskbeing excluded
fromexchangingin a given round,whereas B and D will always have at least one
willing and availablepartner.Although not discussed in such terms by Cook et
al.,it seems that a position'sproneness to exclusionmay be thedeterminingfactor
regarding its occupant's ability to extract advantageous exchange outcomes:
Minimumexcludabilityimpartsmaximumpower.
Despite the interestingfindings,Wilier(1986)noted and published a discussion
of even more serious problemsin the Cook et al. (1983)article.He demonstrated
that "applyingvulnerabilityleads to logicallyand empiricallyimpossibleinferences
in a wide variety of applications."At the time, he offeredno theoreticalalternative
to vulnerabilityfor predictingpower in socialexchangenetworks.Soon thereafter,
he and I began collaboratingon alternativemodels, thus embarkingon a longterm programof theory development and research.
The more we worked on our own theory, the more nagging questions seemed
to emerge with respect to Cook et al.'s approach.For instance, although their
laboratoryexperimentswere straightforwardenough, reasons for certain design
featureswere not always apparent,and their largerpurpose vis-a-vis the powerdependence programwas not so clear. Did the experimentsreallytest the P-D
"framework"?
Theauthorsprovideda set of explicithypothesesforthe experiments,
obtained
from P-D. Yet there were no propositions from which
ostensibly
predictionscould have been logicallyderived.The hypotheses were ad hoc. Did
the experimentsreallytest the vulnerabilitymodel?The data were consistentwith
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vulnerabilitypredictions,but the model was only given post hoc. There was no
claim that vulnerabilitywas used to generate the hypotheses. Why the oneexchangerule?Nothing in P-D mentionssuch a restriction,yet it seemed absolutely
essentialto generatethe experimentalresults.Finally,what was the purposeof the
computersimulations?Werethe experimentsintended to testthem? Althoughthe
experimentalresults roughly conformedto the simulations,the authors did not
claim or imply that the experimentsprovided support for the conclusionsdrawn
fromthe simulations.In fact,the simulationresultswere treatedas havingthe status
of empiricaldata,which in turn were treatedas providingevenfurthercorroboration
for the P-D theory. These researchersare not alone in their failureto realizethat
computersimulationoutput and human behavioraldata are not substitutablefor
one another.As trivialas it may sound, it is apparentlynecessary to emphasize
that theoriesof human social behaviorcan be neithercorroboratednor refutedby
computersimulationsbecause simulationoutput is not human socialbehavior.
To betterunderstandhow computersimulationscould be put to morelegitimate
use in the study of exchange networks, I began developing my own network
exchange simulator.Writingin the MicrosoftQuickBASICprogramminglanguage
and takingclues fromthe relevantCooket al. (1983)footnote,I found it remarkably
easy to reproducetheir findings.I then began to explorealternativespecifications
for key elements in the program.The theoreticalpayoff was almost immediate.
My littlesimulationsmade it eminentlyclearthat powerwas not a resultof network
structuralpatternsalone,but also depended on assumptionsmadeaboutthe actors
in the network.
For instance, consider a network consisting of three people linked via two
relations:A-B-C. Eachrelationrepresentsa channelthroughwhich negotiations
may take place and, thus, the locus of a potential resourceexchange.These early
simulationsrevealedthat,depending upon how actors'negotiationstrategieswere
programmed,any actor'sprofitscould exceed those of any otheractor.Thus,under
some conditions the "intuitive"findingholds:A = C < B. Under other conditions,
however, other orderingsoccurred,for example,A = B = C, A > C > B, and so
forth. Contrarily,all network theories of which I knew asserted unconditionally
that B's centrality should accord that position an advantage over the others
(Markovsky1987).
These simulationsclearlyshowed that much was being left implicitin network
exchange theories. In a sense, the simulationssaid morethan those theories that
try to predict exchange outcomes based on network structure:The theories make
assumptions about the decisions and behaviors of the actors in the network. In
anothersense, they say less:They makeno assumptionsabout structuralfactorsthe very phenomenathat motivatedexchangenetworktheoriesto begin with!The
simulated actors were not programmedto somehow take account of the larger
social network in which they were embedded. The differential resource
fromthe process of interaction.
distributionsemerged
The theoretical status of computer simulations became most apparent to me
while simultaneously working with David Wilier on a mathematicalmodel of
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modelandthecomputer
was
simulation
power in exchange networks.Themathematical
eachtheheartofa different
and
without
Cook
realizingit,
theory.Ironically, apparently
et al.'s (1983)footnote on their simulationalgorithmoffereda rigorousalternative
to their informal, subjective, and inteipietive PD framework.That is, their
simulation "results" were logical derivations from a set of programmed
assumptions,and these providedready-madebut untappedderivationsthat,when
operationalized,could have served as hypotheses for their experiments. The
experimentalresults in fact provided empiricalcorroborationfor their simulation
quatheory!
The simulationsdifferedin at least one very significantway from Cook et al.'s
vulnerabilitymodel and the "graph-theoreticalpower index" (GPI)that we later
published (Markovsky,Wilier,and Patton 1988):The vulnerabilitymodel and GPI
used an analyticapproach to predicting exchange outcomes, whereas the
simulations took an iterative
approach.In general,analytic approachesare more
mathematicallyelegant,allowingderivationsto be calculatedsimply by assigning
any needed initial conditions and/or parametervalues. In contrast,the iterative
approach requires a series of calculations that frequently correspond to the
temporalunfolding of a process. Calculationsfor a given iterationof the model
depend upon results from the previous iteration.The iterativeapproachhas the
potentialto more easily model more "realistic"aspects of a process-for example,
its complex dynamics-and to accommodate more factors without creating
mathematicalintractability.Each approachhas its benefits and costs, and each
emphasizes differentpropertiesof the phenomena it models. To furtherhighlight
this contrast,the followingsectionsreview the networkexchangetheoryin greater
detail,followed by a discussion of the development of the X-Net simulation.
NETWORKEXCHANGETHEORY
Network exchange theory (NET)has developed incrementallyover a number of
years,rooted in the "elementarytheory"and researchof Willerand his colleagues
(Willerand Anderson 1981;Willerand Markovsky1993).The firstversion of NET
(Markovskyet al. 1988)was an attempt to correctproblemsin Cook et al.'s (1983)
vulnerabilitymodel and to develop a more explicit and general formulation.It
resolved the logicalproblemsnoted by Wilier(1986),was consistentwith virtually
all of the results of both old and new network exchange research,and predicted
new classesof phenomenathat were not addressedby othertheories-for example,
powerreversalsand the emergenceof sub-networkswhen the "one-exchangerule"
is relaxed.Laterversions have built from this core formulationand now include
a variety of furtherrefinementsand insights (Markovskyet al. 1993;Skvoretzand
Willer1993;Lovaglia,Skvoretz,Wilier,and Markovskyin press).
The Network ExchangeTheory is fully explicated in the Appendix. The heart
of the theory consists of the Graph-theoreticPower Index (GPI,or Axiom 1) and
three associated axioms. The GPI serves to generate a numericalvalue for the
structuralpower of a given position relative to that of other positions to which
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it is connected. It is based on the idea that a position gains power from having
more relations;a position loses power when those relationshave other relations;
the position gains power from those relations'relationsthat have other relations,
and so on. The GPIfor every position in the networkcan thus be calculatedbased
on simple path-countingrules.
Havingthus calculatedpowerindices,the second axiomspecifieswhen actorswill
be interestedin exchanging-that is, when two actorsrepresentone another'smost
profitable(or least costly) alternatives.Axiom 3 allows us to predictbreaksin the
networkthatresultwhen the structureof relationsmakessome of them unprofitable.
Finally,the last axiomrelatesrelativepower to relativeexchangeoutcomes.
In general,GPIis sensitive to very robustpower differences.Forexample,assume
that actors in each relation of the Bi-A-B2 network are engaged in a series of
negotiations over the division of a pool of 24 resourceunits. An exchange occurs
for a given period when A reaches agreementwith one of the Bs as to who gets
how much of the pool. On the next round,the pool is replenished.However, one
of the Bs was excluded fromthe priorexchange and will try to re-enterby making
better offers to A. Over time, a bidding war between the two Bs results in profit
divisions that approach23-1 favoringA.
Recently, my colleagues and I published an extension of this theory that
generates finer-grainedpredictionsfor a class of networks in which some power
differencesarepredictedto be much weaker(forsupportivetests, see the Appendix,
part2;Markovskyet al.1993).Theidea is that in some networks,ongoing exchanges
produce temporary changes in the number of an actor's available exchange
partners.As a result,power can shift temporarily,creatingsmallpower differences
between actorswho are otherwise equal in structuralpower.
Most recently, extensions to the theory provide methods for predictingactual
profitsfor each position-not just profitorderings(see Appendix,part 3;Skvoretz
and Wilier1993;Lovagliaet al. in press).These have also been supportedthrough
experimental tests. Current research involves further refining, expanding, and
testing the network exchange theory, paying greater attention to dynamics of
negotiations and the properties of individual negotiators (Lovaglia,Skvoretz,
Markovsky,and Wilier1995).
X-NET SIMULATIONS
In 1988I received a grant to furtherdevelop the simple programI had published
the previous year (Markovsky 1987). Thus, almost from the beginning of my
collaborativework on the analytic model I was also exploring the simulation
approach. In fact, the plan was to use NET's experimental setting and scope
conditions as my guide for designing X-Net.

StartingUp
My previous experiencesin computerprogrammingwere ratherlimited.I took
a course in PASCALwhile in graduateschool, but I never became a regularuser
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nor owned a PC version of that powerful language.Apart from the simulations
noted above, I had only written some smallprogramsin MicrosoftBASIC,mostly
for controllingthe presentationof instructionsand collectionof data fromsubjects
in experiments.I decided to use QuickBASIC(QB),another Microsoftproduct.
Alternativesincluded high-level languagesfavoredby serious programmerssuch
as Pascal and C, or others such as SimScriptthat were specially designed for
simulationprogramming.QB'sadvantagesincluded:(1)It developed fromthe older
BASICwith which I was alreadyfamiliarand thus shared much of its command
languageand syntax.(2)It greatlyenhancedBASICby incorporatingpowerfulnew
language elements that permitted more highly structuredprograms.Structured
programming permits larger and better organized programs to be built or
"chunked"from a number of smaller semi-isolated subprograms,where each
subprogramperformsa simplersubtask.With this expansion in capabilities,even
some "serious"programmersbegan to adopt QB. (3) QB was part of a wave of
and
very similarBASICsthat were becomingincreasinglypopular(e.g.,TrueBASIC
in
written
TurboBASIC),making programs
QB relatively transportable.(4) Its
and
were
grammar
syntax
quite intuitive, relatively easy to learn and teach.
Students and colleagueswith little or no programmingexperiencecan look at QB
code and get a pretty good sense of how a programworks. If a programis wellstructuredand internallydocumentedwith commentsand instructions,users with
minimal training can even explore the effects of programmodifications.I have
never regretted settling on QB. The C language and its variants are certainly
speedier and more powerful,and still hold sway among programmers.However,
the ease of developing and modifying X-Net, along with its comprehensibilityto
students and colleagues, more than compensate for the relatively small sacrifice
in execution speed.2
Having chosen my language,I can remembervery well sitting at the computer
ready to begin work on the project.It was at this point that I decided to call the
program "X-Net,"short for eXchange-NETworks.The fact that I named the
programbefore writing any of it hints at the anxiety I felt over possibly having
bitten off more than I could chew. So my firsttask became staving off something
akin to writer'sblock. That first day, I accomplishedlittle more than writing the
code for a big, silly, graphic display designed to flash "X-Net"on the screen at
the start of the program.Although I soon discardedthat part of the program,at
the time it served both to remove the sense of facinga tabularasaand to familiarize
me with some of QB's graphicscapabilities.It also got me thinking about X-Net
fromthe user'spoint of view. As I furtherdeveloped the program,I was motivated
to make X-Net a user'sprogram,as opposed to a programmer's
program.I spent
almostas much time developing a simple,informative,and visually clean interface
as I did the substantivealgorithms.Lateron, this paid dividends in that a number
of people who may otherwise not have done so have used the program and
providedfeedback.
The firsttruly substantialprogramminginvolved writingroutinesto handle the
networks themselves. These capitalizedon the fact that network configurations
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Figure1
a Network
Representing
can be readily stored as matrices of Is and Os.The five-actornetwork in part a
of Figure 1, for example,can be fully describedvia the connection matrixin part
b. The Is indicate relations;the Osnonrelations.When relations are mutual-for
example,A is relatedto B whenever B is relatedto A-then matricessuch as shown
in part b contain redundant information.In fact, the network can be completely
reconstructedbased only on the nonredundantinformationbelow the dashed line,
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as shown in part c of Figure1. Finally,readingacross the successive rows of part
c, all necessaryinformationon the structureof the networkcan be reduced to the
single line shown in part d. In general,all networks with symmetricrelationscan
be so representedusing exactlyN(N-1)/2 digits,whereNis the numberof positions
in the network.
With network configurationsreducible to mere strings of numbers, the first
routine was a subprogramfor readingthese numbersfrom "networkinformation
files."I thought that it would be nice to have a second routine that would allow
users to easily createsuch a file froma back-of-the-envelopedrawingof the desired
network. This routine grew into a completely separate, interactive program,
NETMAKE,that lets the user describeand store a network simply by naming it,
declaringthe number of positions, and answeringa series of N(N-1)/2 yes-or-no
queries concerning which positions are connected to which others. Later, I
incorporated another subprogram (described below) into NETMAKEthat
graphicallydisplays the completednetwork.The user is then asked to eitherverify
the network, start the process again, or exit NETMAKEwithout storing the
network.
Whileat this stage of the project,I made an interestingdiscoveryabout my own
capacitiesfor doing this work that others have since confirmedapplies to them
as well:I could work longer and with greaterefficiencywhen I switched back and
forthbetween the serious,nitty-gritty,programmingon the one hand and the more
visually stimulatinguser-interfaceon the other hand. It is quite common to "get
stuck" when programming-to not be able to locate a bug or to not be able to
muster sufficientconcentration,for example.At such times, it is usually best to
set aside the problemfor a while and go on to other things. When "otherthings"
includea differentset of programmingtasks,which was the casewith the program's
graphicdisplays,other parts of the programcontinue to be developed during the
"break"and time is thus used more efficiently.Forme, the user interfacedisplays
were generallyeasier to programthan the network exchange processes,and they
provided the added benefit of immediategratification.As a result of this strategy,
the user interfaceevolved in step with the more technicalcomponents.
ProgramStructuresand Functions
The programmingdescribedthus farwas very straightforward.It was not long,
however,beforeI had to begin developingroutinesfornegotiationsand exchanges
amongactorsin the networks.Thismeantdevising a simulatedworldthat satisfied
the scope conditions of the Network ExchangeTheory (Appendix,part 1). The
laboratoryexperiments provided a useful model. In these experiments, actors
negotiate and exchange within each of a series of rounds. A single experiment
involving the same group of actors could consist of, say, 10 rounds. Multiple
experimentsconducted with multiplegroups of subjectswould then be repeated
and the results aggregatedto permit more powerful inferencesregardingeffects
of positions and other variables.
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Accordingto the theory'sfirstscope condition(SC1),allactorsmust use the same
strategy.This was certainlya handy simplificationfor purposes of programming.
Any differentialexchange outcomes that emerged in simulationswould then have
to be the result of structuraldifferencesamong the positions that actorsoccupied
and not due to idiosyncraticbehaviors of those actors. SC2 asserted that every
position must be relatedto, and seek exchange with, one or more other positions.
The network description routines did not prevent the user from describing an
isolate. However, that isolate would obviously never engage in negotiations or
exchanges, so this condition posed no special problem. SC6 was satisfied by
providinga fixed resourcepool for each relation,with 24 units by default(because
most experimentsused 24 units per pool).
The remaining scope conditions were trickierin that they delimited various
aspects of the exchange settings and processes to which NET was deemed
applicable,but without actually specifying any concrete features.That is fine for
scope conditions but not as useful for writing a simulation.We return to this
problembelow.
At this point, I had a set of actors, network relations,and resource pools. The
next problemwas how to breathlife into this system and have the actorsnegotiate
over and divide up those resources. The theory provided no solution to this
problem. After all, the theory sought to use structures to predict exchange
outcomes; it did not set out to model negotiation processes. Thus, whereas the
theory had essentially determinedthe programup to this point, fromhere on the
programwas underdeterminedvis-a-vis the theory. For instance, the theory did
not say how actors should decide with whom to negotiate, how much to offer,
how to evaluate offersreceived, when to accept another'soffer,or how to adjust
their offersin view of past outcomes.
The need to fill in missing details forced me out of the theory and into an
exploratorymode. I embarkedon a series of trial-and-errorattempts to make the
simulationdo something
that seemed interesting.One of the firstfeaturesto develop
during this phase was the overall program structure,thanks to the laboratory
experimentsthat served as a template.Thereare plainly multiple nested "levels"
of activity in network exchange research,as illustratedin Figure2. Level 1, or the
This corresponds to an entire network
"top" level, consists of the Experiment.
exchange experiment involving multiple groups of subjects run in the same
network configuration,but at differenttimes. The results of these differentgroups
can be described via aggregatedvariables-that is, average profits per exchange
acrossall subjectsoccupying a given networkposition.Forinstance,we might say
that "afterrunning five different groups of subjects in the Bi-A-B2 network,
position A averaged20 points."
Level 2 consists of Sessions.One experimentcontains multiple sessions, where
each session involves a group of subjects(or simulatedactors)engagingin a series
of negotiationsand exchanges.
Level 3 then consists of the Roundsthat comprise a session. Within a session,
subjects are usually restrictedas to the number of deals they can make within
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1

Experiments

Sessions 1
Rounds
| 1 2 13 14

II2
...

I 1 2 13 14 |...

1

3
1 2 13 14 ...

Figure2
X-Net ProgramLevels
a given round, although they are often free to negotiate with multiple partners,
making offers and counteroffers to each.
Prior to developing X-Net, these were the only program levels that seemed
essential, with the exception of a "bottom" Actionslevel in which actors make offers
and counteroffers. Each of the three levels would perform a few chores such as
initializing variables (i.e., resetting to zero or one certain variables used the last
time the program entered the particular level) and running a program loop that
moves through tasks at the next lower level.
The specific subprograms developed as follows. At the Experimentlevel, a
subprogram called MainMenu displays a set of selectable options for the user (see
Figure 3)-that is, receive "General information" on the program, "Make or delete
a network" from the list of stored networks, "Run a simulation," or "Exit the
program." Choosing the first option results in a series of informational screens. The
second choice "chains" to the NETMAKE program. Choosing the third option
causes a menu of networks to appear (see Figure 4). After a network is chosen,
the Simulations menu is displayed (see Figure 5). Here, the user may run the
simulation with default parameter values, or change parameters prior to running
the simulation. Parameters subject to manipulation include the size of the resource
pool in all relations or in each relation (default = 24);the number of deals permitted
all positions or particular positions (default = 1); the number of rounds per session
(default = 25); the number of sessions (default = 10);and which of several available
strategies would be employed by the actors. (Because actors are simulated,
distinctions between the concepts of "strategy" and "tactic" are not crucial here.)
After implementing any parameter changes, users are permitted to either run the
simulation, make further parameter changes, or exit the program.
Figure 6, which illustrates the entire program structure, shows the MainMenu
contained within the Experimentlevel, sitting atop all of the other levels of the
program. When the user chooses to "Run a simulation," X-Net continues through
the Experimentlevel and runs the SessionReady routine. This subprogram reads
in the information on the chosen network, establishes which relations exist, sets
up a graphical display for the user, and initializes several session-level variables.
The graphical display, reproduced in Figure 7, places all network positions around
an ellipse, draws lines to connect positions related in the network, labels position
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Routines

Level Number

Figure6
X-Net ProgramStructure

#1, shows the sequence numbersof the currentsession and round as the program
executes, and displays the name assigned to the network.When the SessionLoop
routine is entered,the program"pushes"down to Level 2, as shown in Figure6.
At Level 2, Sessions,RoundReadysimply initializesseveraldata storagevariables
and actors'initialoffersfor the session (halfof the resourcepool size, by default)
and then enters the RoundLoopwhich pushes the programdown to Level 3. Here
is where I found it necessary to make a variety of assumptionsabout negotiation
and exchange processes, and these developed gradually,through trialand error.
At some point, I settled on an approach that introduced one more logical
programminglevel. Within each round, a given actor may go through a number
of cycles of offersto others-that is, as if pullingeach (andevery)potentialpartner's
name out of hat and checking to see if the other's offer is reasonable.Hence, I
adopted the name Cyclesfor the fourth level. The Roundslevel first preparesfor
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bot ie-sten

Round: 25

#1

Figure7
in
Early a Simulation
these cycles with the CycleReady routine. Its procedures turned out to be
somewhat elaborate. It "activates" actors who may have made early exchanges
in the early cycles of a previous round and, thus, been "dormant" for later cycles.
It also initializes variables that pertain to whether (1) a given other is sought for
exchange, (2) another who is sought also seeks the given actor, and (3) a given
strategy has been selected by the user. Then, the program enters the CycleLoop
and pushes down to Level 4.
The Cycleslevel consists of three subprograms, starting with SeekExchange. This
routine immediately enters the lowest level of the program, Actions,in which actors
make judgments that depend upon their strategy as selected by the user. For
example, one strategy flags those among an actor's alternative partners who have
made acceptable offers, then notes (or "seeks exchange" with) a number of those
others corresponding to the number of exchanges the actor is permitted in each
round. By another strategy, compromises are calculated and then exchange is
sought with the other(s) making the most profitable offer(s). After making this
provisional selection of exchange partners, the program then "pops" up to the Cycle
level (although we continue moving down in Figure 6), this time to run two more
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End of a Simulation

routines.CheckRecipmoves throughthe networkand flagsrelationsin which both
actorshave chosen one anotherin the SeekExchangeroutine.When such mutual
exchange-seeks are found, exchanges are declared to have occurred in those
relations.Then the Pull routine temporarily"pulls"fromthe network those actors
who have completed exchanges.The cycle continues to execute until all possible
exchangeshave occurred.Thishappens relativelyquickly,forwhen a pairof actors
has exchanged and been pulled from the network, those who remain no longer
try to deal with them, thus speeding the process of searchingfor a viable partner
in that round.
When no more exchanges can take place, the cycling has ended and, therefore,
so does the round. The programpops back up to the Roundslevel and stores the
results of the last set of exchanges via the RoundDataroutine. Then the process
enters the NewOffers routine in which actors decide how much they will offer
in the next round of negotiations in light of what happened in the negotiations
just completed.
Having decided upon NewOffers for the next round, the programloops back
to CycleReadyand CycleLoop,following the same process just described.When
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the designated number of rounds has been completed, the programpops up to
the Sessionslevel where it stores data for the now completed session and updates
the graphicalimage on the screen. This consists of increasing the sizes of the
networkpositions in proportionto the relativequantitiesof resourcesaccumulated
by each over its last five exchanges. When all of an experiment'ssessions have
been run, the program pops back up to the top Experimentlevel. There,
DisplayFinalNetshows a finalgraphicdisplay (Figure8, for example)with results
accumulatedacross all of the sessions, thereby providing an accuratedepiction
of averageresourcedifferentialsby network position.It also redrawsthe network
connections to indicate the frequenciesof exchanges occurringin each relation:
heavierlines indicatehigher frequencies.Finally,if the user chose to do so earlier,
WriteDatastoresnumericalresultsto a disk file.The simulationrun concludeswith
the opening "MainMenu"again displayed.
Developing the GraphicalDisplay
Within a few weeks of startingto work on the program,I agreed to discuss it
at a seminar.The seminar was to be on a Monday. The Fridaybefore my talk, I
realizedthat it would be nice to be able to demonstratethe simulationby showing
networks on the screen and providing some type of dynamic image of resource
accumulations.In my rush to have somethingon time,I stumbledon a nice display
algorithmthat is no doubt unoriginal,but works well for X-Net.The programuses
trigonometricfunctions to evenly distributethe network positions-tiny circles,
actually-around an imaginaryellipse on the screen.As shown in Figure7, solid
lines are added to indicatepairsof positions deemed to be in a relation.Aftereach
experiment,if a position earned resources,the size of the circlerepresentingthat
position is increased.Actually,anothercircleis drawn aroundthe previous circle,
with the radiusof the new circleproportionalto the resourcesper exchangeearned
during the last five rounds of each session. At the conclusion of an Experiment,
the solidity of the lines connecting actors is reduced according to the relative
frequenciesof exchanges between actors;the more frequentlya relationis used,
the more solid the line. Thereare sixteen gradationsof line density, and these are
normalizedso that the most frequentlyused relationalways has a solid line and
the least often used relationis only sparsely dotted. The result of this DisplayNet
routineis a representationthat is easily interpretablefor relativelysmall networks
while still portrayinga great deal of information.Because of this, I rarely opt to
store numericaloutput.
CrucialRoutines
Of the routines describedabove, SeekExchange
and NewOffers
are most crucialfor
controls the
determiningthe ultimate results from the simulations.SeekExchange
controls offer-revisionstrategies.As
partner-selectionprocess, whereas NewOffers
one indication of their importance,these routines comprise less than 4%of the
program code, but they took at least as long to write as the remaining 96%.
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Moreover,these two routines were the sites for the new assumptions that were
needed to compensate for the theory's inabilityto fully determine the program.
marksthe beginning of every negotiationcycle. At the instant the
SeekExchange
programengages this routine,each actoralreadyknows its outgoing and incoming
offers for all of its relations.The problem at this point is to instruct actors how
to deal with theirinformation.I had anticipatedhaving many choiceswhen it came
to programmingconcessionstrategies-that is, how actorsmodifytheiroffersfrom
round to round.As obvious at it now seems in retrospect,it did not occur to me
that I would also have to devote a significantamount of time to devising another
algorithmfor having actorsarbitratemultipleoffers.
One simplificationassumes that actorscannot change any of their offersduring
a round, even if there are multiple cycles within the round. A second checks to
see whether mutual offers add up to the number of availableunits in the pool.
Given a 24-unitpool, if actorA offers12 units to B, and actorB offersto relinquish
only 10, we find that 10 + 12 = 22, two less than the 24 units available.A and
B thus cannot completea deal this round.In contrast,when offerssum to or exceed
the pool, they are said to be complementary.
determinesand talliesa list of others
In every round,for each actor,SeekExchange
with whom an actor'soffersare complimentary.Next, it sends that list to a routine
that returns it shuffled. Finally,given that M is the maximum number of deals
an actor can make in a given round, each actor designates the first M others on
its list as "otherswith which I will seek to exchange."Controlthen moves to the
routine.Here,the networkis scanned to find pairsof relatedactorswho
CheckRecip
guaranteesthat
explicitlysought exchange fromeachother.Note that SeekExchange
no actorwill have morethanM reciprocations,and so every reciprocatedexchangeseek is declareda completed deal. The numberof resourceunits received by each
actoris noted.
and CheckRecip
do not guaranteethat all actorswho can makedeals
SeekExchange
each of
actuallydo so. For instance,consider the line of four actorsA-B-C-D,
whom can make one deal per round.In the firstround, suppose each actoroffers
12-12 pool divisions with those to whom it is related. All offers are thus
complimentary.A has no choice but to seek exchange from B, and D from C.
However,suppose that when B'sshuffledlist comes back,A is at the top, and when
C'scomes back,B is at the top. A and B completea deal,but despite D's availability,
C is left hanging. This is where the cycling process enters. The Pull routine will
remove A and B from the list of active negotiatorsand determine that C and D
and CheckRecip,
arestillactivein this round.Theprogramloops backto SeekExchange
C and D make their deal, and Pull removes them from the active list. With the
active list now empty, the round is over.
This algorithm emerged from a trial-and-errorprocess. There are probably
alternatives,and I recall my intuition telling me that some of them should have
been ableto accomplishthe same tasksin a simplerway. However,each alternative
that I tried ended up either introducingbiases in actors' partnerchoices, being
at least as complex as the method described above, or operatingless efficiently.
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B

A1

A2
Figure9
C May ExchangeTwice
NewOffers modifies actors offers to others. It is enacted at the end of every

exchange round, after all deals have been made. Once again, there are many
possibilities for negotiation algorithms. After its initial development, some of my
work with X-Net involved exploring the effects of different strategies when enacted
by those in various network positions (e.g., Markovsky et al. 1993). In the early
stages, however, I wanted to introduce the simplest possible strategy that would
permit replication of laboratory experiments (Markovsky 1992). Generally, this
meant specifying a minimal strategy that would allow actors in advantageous
positions to profit from their structural advantages and that would prevent those
in disadvantageous positions from giving up and withdrawing.
The first thing I tried was to simply have actors raise their offers to others by
one unit if they were excluded from exchange on a previous round, and lower
their offers by a unit if they were not excluded. This method was used in simulations
reported by Cook et al. (1983).Although it is indeed simple, the strategy only works
if actors are permitted at most one exchange per round. For example, in Figure
9, if actor C is permitted two exchanges but only completes one deal with D and
cannot complete any with B, then C would have to be designated as excluded
from exchange. In the next round, C would then have to make a better offer to
D, despite having just successfully completed an exchange with D. Experiments
with human subjects show that positions like C are members of two domains
(Markovsky et al. 1988; the Appendix provides criteria for identifying domains).
In this case, C has equal power in the domain shared with D, and low power in
the domain shared with B and the As. Unless C is "intelligent" enough to somehow
make these distinctions, it will suffer not only in exchanges with B but in those
with D as well.
After exploring a variety of possibilities, I could devise only one algorithm that
was both useful and extremely simple: (1) If an actor makes all of the deals it seeks,
then it decreases all of its offers in the next round; (2) if the actor fails to make
all the deals it seeks, then the actor (a) decreases its offers to those with whom
it completed a deal and (b) increases its offers to those with whom it did not.
NewOffers thus satisfies two more of NET's scope conditions: SC2 and SC3 require
that inclusion in exchange leads to decreased offers, and exclusion leads to
increases. SC4 (accept best offer, randomly choose among ties) is not always
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satisfiedby X-Net decision strategy options. In the default strategy,for example,
actorsselect randomlyamong not only tied offersbut anyoffersthat complement
their own. They satisficeratherthan maximize.Other user-selectablestrategiesdo
fully satisfy SC4. In many cases, having a fairly large number of rounds
compensates for inefficienciesin the first strategy,and so long-run outcomes are
not differentiallyaffectedby these alternativepartner-selectionstrategies.This is
not true in general,however. One of the majorfindings to emerge from X-Net is
that the sensitivity of exchange outcomes to the strategicbehaviors of actors is
highly variabledepending on structuralfeaturesof the network.
With the addition of several "housekeeping"facilities,the completion of these
crucialroutinesresultedin a workableprogram.I then spent some time smoothing
out the user interface,developing the menu-generatingroutine, cleaning up the
programcode, and insertingmore descriptivecommentsforpeople who may wish
to readthe programitself.I also created20 or so starternetworksthat would appear
on the Select a Network menu, wrote some external documentation,and wrote
routinesforcallingup an online programdescriptionand forstoringthe numerical
simulationresults in formatteddata files.
Starting with a later version of the program,X-Net reads a list of program
parameterdefaults from a separatetext file. Thus, following editing instructions
file, the user may establish his or her own program
given in this "XNET.PAR"
defaults.At the same time,I addedthe menuingsystem whereby,with the program
running, the user can change the value of any relation's resource pool, the
maximumexchanges per round for any position, and the number of rounds and
experiments.Further,I provided user-selectablealternativedecision strategiesfor
actors. For example, rather than satisficing-that is, selecting randomly among
complementaryoffersregardlessof their values-actors may instead firstreach a
compromise in all of their relations by splitting the difference (making equal
compromises)when offers are initiallynoncomplementary.Then, depending on
the strategychosen, actorseitherselect randomlyamong theirrelationsforexplicit
exchange-seeksor rankthe offersthey receiveand only seek exchangefromothers
offering the most. The effects of these relatively minor strategic changes have
proven to be nil in some networks but rather profound in others. Again, the
programis superb for illustratingthe conclusion, carriedforwardfrom the first
BASICexchange simulations,that neitherstructurenor strategyalone is sufficient
to predictexchange outcomes.
CONCLUSIONS:LINKINGTHEORY,SIMULATION,AND REALITY
Whilehaving a good deal of fun with this project,I have also been strugglingwith
deeper questions:What is X-Net'srelevanceto NETor vice versa, and what is its
connectionto reality?It is a relativelysimplematterto slaptogethera set of routines
and producea dynamicsystem. Towardwhat ends such activitiesareuseful (aside
fromhaving fun) is anothermatterentirely.
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Mathematicsprovides a variety of analyticapproachesfor generatingoutcomes
("solutions")for models of systems. For social exchange networks,too, there are
alternativesto GPI (e.g., Bienenstockand Bonacich1992;Friedkin1992;Marsden
1983;Cook and Yamagishi1992).Eachprovides a model that generatespredictions
for resource distributionsbased on explicit assumptions or axioms. Simulations,
it may be argued,prove especiallyuseful when such solutions cannot be achieved
or do not exist. Ironically,an analytic solution may be unavailablebecause our
knowledge about the phenomenon is poor or because our knowledge is so rich.
In the firstcase,the lackof knowledgepreventsexplicationof a model.In the second
case,we want the model to be so complexthat mathematicalanalysisis prohibited.
Traditionally,simulationsattempt to model the essential components of a realworld system, to illustratethe workings of the system over time, and to generate
summary informationabout the system and the behaviorof its elements. To the
extent that the relevant variables and relationships among them have been
representedaccurately,the simulationshould generateoutcomesthat approximate
those of the system it models. When one or more of those connections is
probabilistic,then for a given set of starting conditions, over many runs the
simulationshould yield correctpredictionsforthe relativelikelihoodsof the various
possible outcomes.
This is, perhaps,the most common view of simulations,but it reveals only half
the picture. Instead of operating on elements and connections that represent
components of some real-world system, simulations may also operate on
systems (Hanneman1988;Fararo
components taken from one or more theoretical
and Hummon 1994).This need not be as divorced from reality as it sounds, for
the theories that are being simulatedare themselves presumablyinterpretablefor
empiricalphenomena. What this amounts to is not so much a differenttype of
simulationas a differentway of regardingsimulations.Ratherthan a method for
examiningempiricalevents and processes,simulationsbecome a method fordoing
theoretical
analysis.
The distinction between theoreticalanalysis and empiricalanalysis was made
eminently clear by Jasso (1988). Whereas the latter involves primarily the
examinationof empiricaldata,theoreticalanalysisincludes,among otheractivities,
derivinglogicallyimpliedconsequencesfroma minimalset of premises.According
to Jasso, this is the activity of longest duration and comprises most of what a
mathematicaltheoristdoes. It is also a task that I believe may be greatlyfacilitated
by the use of computersimulations.I would even arguethat as our theoriesbecome
morecumulativeand sophisticated,simulationswill become essentialforexploring
their logical consequences prior to empirical testing-just as in a number of
branchesof the physical sciences. In fact, as theoreticalcomplexity increasesand
the likelihood of devising analytic solutions diminishes, simulationbecomes the
only tenable method for derivingtestable theoreticalconsequences.
For me, the network exchange simulationsillustratedways that even a smallscale simulationprojectcan yield payoffs.First,I developed a deeper appreciation
of the beauty of simple and clear models that generate rich and varied
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consequences. Sociology already has plenty of complex and nonparsimonious
models for explainingphenomena.To generatea broadrange of predictionsfrom
small,carefullyselected sets of assumptionsis an alternativewith greaterpotential
forgeneralityand cumulation(Markovsky1994).Simulationsthus providea means
for exploringthe rangeof a theory'sexplanationsand predictions.
Additionally,translatingeven a relativelysimple theory into a series of program
steps imposes a strictformof honesty and integrityupon the theory.Forthe same
reasonthat it is much easierto claimthat your theory logicallyexplainssomething
than it is to proveit, it is far easierto imaginea simulationthan it is to construct
one
that does something interesting.One is constantly forcedto question theoretical
assumptionswhen fittingtogetherthe pieces of the simulation.Tovaryingdegrees,
we are probably all guilty of overstating the explanatorypower of our favorite
theories. Simulations-as-translated-theories
do only what they do, and nothing
more. Of course, nothing prevents an author from overgeneralizinghis or her
simulation.The added rigor imposed by the logic of a structuredprogramming
language should, however, ease the skeptic's task. The burden of proof is on the
theorist to show how real-worldelements manifestelements of the simulation.If
the theory motivatingthe simulationis vague, such proofwill not be possible.
Third,X-Net has led to insights that, in turn, have led to a broadeningof the
scope and refinementof the predictionsof NetworkExchangeTheory.Forexample,
severalyears ago, my colleagueMichaelLovagliawas playing aroundwith X-Net.
He noticed a phenomenon that I had also found in a variety of types of networks:
in certainnetworks whose positions were predictedby NET (the 1988version) to
be equal in power, some network positions would consistentlyhave small but
noticeableadvantagesover others.WhereasI had ignored those small differences
under the assumptionthey were artifactsor programbugs, Lovagliabelieved that
the effectwas real-that is, theoreticallyand empiricallyrelevant.As it turned out,
we later discovered the structuralbasis for those "weak power" effects (see
Appendix, part 2) and went on to develop an analytic model and experimental
tests that indeed verified the weak-power predictions (Markovsky 1992;
Markovskyet al. 1993).Furthermore,predictions from the new analytic model
convergedprecisely on X-Net outcomes.
Finally,and perhapsmost controversially,one use of simulationscan be to help
us think less concretely about the world; to adopt a more abstracting and
generalizingmode as opposed to a more journalisticand interpretiveone. Each
mode has its own interesting and useful products. My sense is, however, that
sociology-and certainlythe world outside of sociology-already appreciatethe
work of those who, for example, describe public opinions and beliefs. Less
appreciated,and arguablyfarmore beneficial are the fruitsof theoreticallaborin
the social sciences-theories that explainthe emergence of opinion and belief
systems, for example,ratherthan just describingthem. We can learn much from
piecingtogetheran artificialsocialprocessfromscratch(Websterand Kervin1971).
Some of what we learnmay be useful for explainingAmericansocial phenomena,
social phenomena in other nations, or perhaps even phenomena in nations not
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yet existing or nations on other worlds. It is also quite a revelation to find that
emergent and multilevel phenomena need not be mystical constructs. We can
easily build our own, and these constructions teach us about emergent and
multilevelphenomena in vivo.
APPENDIX
Network ExchangeTheory
Part1: Graph-theoreticPower Index (gpi)
Definitionsof Key Terms
actor:
an entity with the capacityto observe conditions,make judgments,
and act upon them
position: a location that may be occupied by an actor
relation: an exchange potentialbetween a pair of positions
networkE a set of positions, their relations,and the actorsin positions
exchange: a mutually agreed-upon distributionof valued resources between
actors.
a structurallydeterminedpotentialfor obtainingrelativelyfavorable
power:
resourcelevels
Scope Conditions
(1) all actorsuse identicalstrategiesin negotiatingexchanges
(2) actorsconsistently excluded fromexchanges raise their offers
(3) those consistently included in exchanges lower their offers
(4) actors accept the best offerthey receive and choose randomlyin deciding
among tied best offers
(5) each position is related to, and seeks exchange with, one or more other
positions
(6) exchangerounds begin with equalpools of positively valued resourceunits
in every relation
(7) two positions receive resourcesfromtheir common pool if and only if they
exchange
Termsin GPICalculations
i: position in the network
e: number of others with which an actor may exchange (once each) in an
exchange round
d: domain in the network. To calculate domain memberships,let i and j
indicate two positions, and an e+ position is one having more than e
relations.Given the set V of all positions on a path between i and j, i and
j are in the same domain if and only if there exists a path such that either
(1) V = {0}, or (2) all membersof V are e*positions.
kc length of a path. For example,k = 3 for the path fromA to D in network
A-B-C-D-E.
Two paths froma positionarenonintersectingwhen they
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have only that positionin common.Thus,C has two nonintersectingpaths
of length 2: C-B-A and C-D-E.
h: the longest non-intersectingpath froma position
midk:the number of nonintersecting paths of length k in domain d from position i,
pid power index for position i in domaind.
Axioms
= (-l
Axiom 1: pid(ed)=(1e)

1)(k-lmidk

Axiom 2: i seeks exchange with j if and only if pi > pj or if (pi - p) > (pi - pk)

for all k relatedto i.
Axiom 3: i and j can exchange only if each seeks exchange with the other.
Axiom 4: if i and j exchange,then i receives more resourcesthan j if and only
if pi> pj.

Part2: Likelihoodof Incusion and "WeakPower"
Thisextensionof NETbuilds on the GPIto generaterefinedpredictionsforweak
power differentials.Ongoing exchanges can produce temporarychanges in the
number of an actor'savailableexchange partners,in the number of the partners'
partners,and so on, and this formulationis able to take into account temporary
power shifts that arise as some actors exchange in a given time period and leave
behind alteredsubstructures.
Step 1: Apply Axiom 1 to calculateinitialGPIvalues for each position.
Step 2: ApplyAxiom2 to determinewhich positionsseek exchangewith which
others.
Step 3: Apply Axiom 3 to identify and remove relations with nonmutual
exchange-seeks.
Step 4: Apply Axiom 1 to the resultingsubstructures.
Step 5: RepeatSteps 1-4 until the GPIvalues stabilize.
If GPI # 1 for any positions in the network (or a given substructure),then
resourcedistributionsin the network(or substructure)will be orderedby GPIand
approachmaximumdifferentiation.
If GPI= 1 forall positions in the network(ora given substructure),then resource
distributionsin the network (or substructure)will be ordered by the likelihood
of i's inclusionin exchange.
The likelihoodof inclusion,14is calculatedas follows:
Under an equiprobabilityassumption, determine the probabilitythat the
actor in position i and actors in each of its relations will mutually seek
exchange (where actors are allocatede exchange-seeks).L is then the sum
of these probabilitiesacross i's relations.
Part3: ExactPredictionsfor Weak Power Networks
This recent extension provides supplementary theoretical assumptions that
build on the weak power formulation.An alternativeformulationhas also been
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published by Skvoretz and Willer (1993);however, this version provides more
accurate predictions. With this extension, we can derive exact predictions for
exchange outcomes. It employs a modified resistancemodel for predicting
negotiationoutcomes.Then,modificationsto the resistancemodel accountfor the
assumed effects of (1) inclusion likelihoods, using the Resistance-Likelihood
Assumption,and (2) relative degree-the number of an actors' direct relations
The ProfitTheorems
are
relativeto another's-using the Resistance-Degree
Assumption.
used to generate the actual predictionsfor exchange outcomes at each network
position.
P: total points availablein resourcepool
Pi: i's profitfrom exchange
Mi: i's maximumexpectationor "besthope" for exchange profit
Ci: i's worst fearor "conflictoutcome"for exchange profit
Ri: i's resistanceto a given exchange profitPi
ti: i's number of network ties
di: i's relativedegree in the i-j relation:
ResistanceAssumption:

M,= - P
Pi -Ci

Equiresistance
Assumption:In equilibratedi-j exchanges, Pj = P - P4 and Pi is
obtainedby solving:
M -Pj
Mi-P
Pi- Ci

Pi - C

Resistance-Likelihood
Assumption:
(a) Ci=

li

P
(b) Mi= p(l +1)
Assumption:
Resistance-Degree
ci=

P2

ProfitTheorems:From the Equiresistanceand Resistance-LikelihoodAssumptions, we derive:
P=

(P + CQ- C) / 2

P,i= P- P,
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NOTES

1. The X-Net programdescribedhereinis availableupon requestat no charge.
2. Aftera series of rapid upgradesleading to version 4.5, Microsoftceased improvingon
QuickBASICaround 1988.Over the following two years, it was eclipsed by the more
powerful and expensive BASIC Professional Development System, a superset of
QuickBASICwith an identical interface. Shortly thereafter,BASICPDS upgrades
stopped and the price of the last version (7.1)was greatlyreduced,apparentlyto make
way forVisualBasic,designed to work in conjunctionwith MicrosoftWindows.
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